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Abstract. Subscription privacy of a user has been a historical concern
with all the previous generation mobile networks, namely, GSM, UMTS,
and LTE. While a little improvement have been achieved in securing
the privacy of the long-term identity of a subscriber, the so called IMSI
catchers are still in existence even in the LTE and advanced LTE net-
works. Proposals have been published to tackle this problem in 5G based
on pseudonyms, and different public-key technologies. This paper looks
into the problem of concealing long-term identity of a subscriber and
presents a technique based on identity based encryption (IBE) to tackle
it. The proposed solution can be extended to a mutual authentication
and key agreement protocol between a serving network (SN) and a user
equipment (UE). This mutual authentication and key agreement pro-
tocol does not need to connect with the home network (HN) on every
run. A qualitative comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of
different techniques show that our solution is competitive for securing
the long-term identity privacy of a user in the 5G network.
1 Introduction
The NGMN Alliance has pointed out the privacy of a user as a requirement of
the 5G network [1]. When a user equipment (UE) tries to connect to a network,
the UE has to identify itself using an identifier. Once the UE is identified, an
authentication protocol is run between the UE and the network. There are two
types of attackers against the user privacy. A passive attacker just listens to
the radio communication and tries to figure out identity of the user. An active
attacker may transmit some radio messages itself. It is easier to protect against a
passive attacker than an active attacker. Since 2G (GSM) the network has used
temporary identities to protect against passive attackers. However, even in the
LTE network the permanent identity is not protected against active attackers.
We discuss solutions to conceal the long-term identifier known as interna-
tional mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) during the identification phase. These
solutions are based on pseudonyms and public-key encryption. The pseudonym
based approaches require to maintain a synchronization of pseudonyms between
the UE and the HN. We discuss solutions based on certificates and root-key for
the category of public key. Public-key based solutions do not require any syn-
chronization. However, the public-key based solutions have higher cost both in
terms of communication and computation.
We propose a novel solution based on identity based encryption (IBE). One
additional advantage of our solution is that, it also works as a mutual authen-
tication protocol between SN and UE without the involvement of the HN every
time the authentication is needed. This advantage can not be achieved using
root-key based approach. This advantage can be achieved using certificate based
approach, but it is the heaviest in terms of communication and computation. We
evaluate our solutions based on the following criteria: (1) Immunity to attackers,
(2) Parts of the IMSI concealed, (3 ) Signalling overhead, (4) Latency, (5) PKI
complexity, (6) Public-key revocation, etc. The choice of the solution depends on
how much we want to achieve. Our solution based on IBE becomes a competitive
one by meeting most of the important requirements.
2 3GPP-defined Aspects of Mobile Networks
A subscription describes the commercial relationship between the subscriber and
the service provider, cf. 3GPP TR 21.905 [3]. A subscription identifier uniquely
identifies a subscription in the 3GPP system and is used to access networks based
on 3GPP specifications. Subscription privacy refers to the right to protect any
information that can be used to identify a subscription to whom such information
relates. This definition of privacy suggests to protect any personally identifiable
information (PII) from an attacker. While it may be difficult to draw a clear
boundary between PII and non-PII, the long-term identifier is surely a PII.
2.1 System Overview
In the case of GSM, 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) networks, IMSI is a long-term
identity of a subscriber. An IMSI is usually presented as a 15 digit number but
can be shorter. The first 3 digits are the mobile country code (MCC), followed
by the mobile network code (MNC), either 2 digits or 3 digits. The length of the
MNC depends on the value of the MCC. The remaining digits are the mobile
subscription identification number (MSIN) within the network [4].
In order to present an easily comprehensible discussion, we need to know what
are the entities and communication interfaces are involved in this identification
process. We also need to know which entities can be entrusted with the IMSI
of a subscriber. As the architecture of 5G is yet to be finalized, we present an
abstraction of the involved entities and assume that whatever the architecture
of 5G will eventually be, it will contain something for each of these entities
and something for each of these interfaces. Figure 1 shows the abstraction. The
abstraction involves the UE, SN and HN. Note that in a non-roaming situation,
the SN and HN are the same network. There are two more entities which are
not part of the network but relevant in our discussion, because they attack the
network. They are passive IMSI catcher (PIC) and active IMSI cather (AIC).
The logical interface between UE and SN is initially unprotected. The logical
interface between SN and HN is protected. The PICs eavesdrop on the UE-RAN
interface when it is unprotected to extract an IMSI. The AICs impersonate a
legitimate SN and run a legitimate looking protocol with the UE in order to find
out the IMSI.
HN and UE both know the IMSI and they are trusted. Both of PIC and
AIC are untrusted. It is in principle possible not to trust SN. However, by other
specifications in 3GPP TS 33.106 [5] and TS 33.107 [6], it is required to reveal
IMSI to the SN to enable lawful interception (LI) without involving HN.
Fig. 1. High-level security architecture
2.2 Current Solution Approach and its Weakness
One approach of protecting IMSI privacy is to use a temporary identifier instead
of the actual IMSI and keep changing the temporary identifier frequently. Note
that the temporary identifier has to be assigned confidentially. Different entities
of the network may assign different temporary identifiers to the UE.
In the LTE network, the temporary identifier assigned by an SN is called
globally unique temporary identity (GUTI) and the HN does not assign any
temporary identifier to the UE. However, during the initial attachment of a UE
to the SN, the UE has neither a GUTI nor a security context with the SN that
can assign it with a GUTI. Besides, GUTI can be lost by either one or both of
the UE and the SN. This would force the UE to reveal its IMSI to the SN to
keep itself from permanently locked out of the network.
This problem gives an opportunity to an AIC who impersonates a legitimate
SN and forces the UE to run the initial attachment protocol. This also gives an
opportunity to a PIC to eavesdrop the IMSI sent in cleartext. Solutions [7,8,9,10]
have been proposed by using temporary IMSI known as pseudonym. While these
solutions solve the cases of lost and unsynchronised GUTI, they still have the
problem of lost or unsynchronised pseudonyms. Public-key technologies have also
been considered as potential approach to solve this problem.
3 Discussion on Different Proposed Solutions
Before delving into different proposed those solutions, let us introduce some
notation.
1. hnid, snid = MCC||MNC identifies the HN and SN respectively
2. eA, dA is the public and private key of entity A respectively
3. XA,B(eA, eB) is the certificate of the public key eA of A. The certificate can
be verified by anyone who considers B as a root CA using the public key eB.
The certificate is a guarantee from B that the public key eA is owned by A .
4. E,D are encryption and decryption functions so that D(E(M,K),K) = M .
5. S(M,K) is the signature of message M signed by the key K
3.1 Solution Based on Pseudonyms:
Pseudonym based solutions have been proposed in [8,7,9,10]. In this kind of
solutions, temporary identifiers called pseudonyms are assigned to a UE. Next
time when the UE tries to identify itself to an SN, it uses a pseudonym instead
of IMSI. Periodically, whenever there is an opportunity, the HN sends a new
pseudonym to the UE with confidentiality and integrity protection. One such
opportunity could be when the HN sends the authentication vector to an SN.
3.2 Solution Based on Certificate Based Public-key Cryptography
Use of certificate based public-key encryption to conceal long-term identity has
been suggested in 3GPP TR 33.821 [11]. To use certificate based public-key
cryptography, we need to figure out who are the root CAs and who else can be
a CA, who own a public key, how a certificate can be revoked, and how the UE
can be re-provisioned with a new root certificate if needed. Different solutions
can be devised based on the choice of root CAs and other CAs. We provide a
high-level description for few variants of certificate based solution.
Variant 1: It uses a global root of trust. There is a global entity trusted by
everyone. Using this trusted global entity, a chain of trust can be established.
The SN presents the certificate to a UE trying to attach. The UE verifies the
certificate. If the verification result is positive, the UE encrypts its IMSI using
the public key of the SN and sends to the SN.
Variant 2: In this variant the HN of a subscriber is the root CA. The HN gener-
ates a public-private key pair and generates a certificate of the public key signed
by the HN itself. A UE is provisioned with this self signed certificate. An SN in-
terested to serve a UE obtains a certificate Xsnid,hnid(esnid, ehnid). The UE sends
hnid, ehnid to the SN. The SN looks up for the certificate Xsnid,hnid(esnid, ehnid).
In case it exists at the disposal of the SN, the SN sends it to the UE. The UE
verifies the certificate. If the certificate is verified as valid, then the UE sends
the IMSI to the SN encrypted by the public key esnid of the SN.
Variant 3: In this variant, there is no other CA than the root CA. Hence the
chain of certificates is very short. Only an HN can be a CA. The certificates of
all the SNs a UE might visit are pre-provisioned to the UE by the HN. When a
UE attempts to attach to an SN, the UE encrypts the IMSI with the public key
of the SN which is already provisioned to the UE. If the public key of an SN is
revoked, the HN has to provision the revocation to the UE.
3.3 Solution Based on Root-key based Encryption
We use only one pair of public-private key pair in this approach. Such a technique
has been proposed in 3GPP TR 33.899 in solution #7.3. This key pair is owned
by the HN and we call it to be the root-key. The HN provisions the public key
to all its UEs. Instead of sending the IMSI, the UE encrypts the IMSI with the
public root key and sends the result to the SN along with the hnid. The SN
sends the encrypted IMSI to the HN. The HN decrypts the IMSI and sends the
IMSI back to the SN along with an authentication vector (AV).
3.4 Solution Based on IBE
In the next section we discuss the basic principles of IBE and present a solution
of the identity privacy using IBE.
4 Details of the IBE Based Solution
4.1 How IBE works
The idea of IBE was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 [12]. In IBE, the public
and private keys of a receiver are computed from the identity of the receiver in
conjunction with the public and private key of a trusted third party respectively.
A sender does not need to authenticate the public key of a receiver each time
the sender and the receiver agree on a security context. The authenticity of the
public key in IBE is guaranteed by the trusted third party.
Usually in IBE, the trusted third party is known as the private key generator
(PKG). The private key of the receiver has to be provisioned to the receiver by
the PKG. It is impossible to revoke the public key in IBE unless the identity itself
is revoked. Please note that a PKG knows the private keys of all the receivers.
As a result a PKG can decrypt any message sent by any sender to any receiver.
This implies that there must be a very high level of trust in the PKG.
Dan Boneh and Matthew Franklin published a fully functional IBE scheme
in 2003 [13]. The security of this scheme was based on a natural analogue of
the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Based on this assumption they
showed that the new system has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle
model. To make the revocation of public keys easier, this scheme also suggests
to use an expiry time as part of the identity of a receiver. We use this suggestion
in our solution. Clifford Cocks present an implementation in 2001 [14] and show
that the security of the implementation is related to the difficulty of solving the
quadratic residuosity problem.
4.2 Existing proposals of Using IBE in 5G Network
RFC 6508 [15] presents an algorithm SAKKE for establishment of a secret shared
value. Applications of SAKKE may include a date-time component in their iden-
tity to ensure that identities and hence the corresponding private-keys are only
valid for a fixed period of time. Solution #7.11 in 3GPP TR 33.899 [2] uses IBE
to protect the long-term identity according to RFC 6508. However, the solu-
tion does not address the issue of revocation of the identity based public-keys.
RFC 6507 [16] describes a certificate-less signature scheme based on IBE. In this
scheme a string called public validation token (PVT) randomly chosen by the
PKG is assigned to an identity. Both the public and private key of a receiver
are computed using the PVT along with the receiver’s identity. So, the public
key associated with an identity can be revoked by revoking the PVT. Solution
#2.14 in 3GPP TR 33.899 presents an authentication framework based on the
signature scheme of RFC 6507 and the authentication protocol EAP-TLS. This
solution uses the PVT to revoke the public key associated with an identity. How-
ever, in this solution it is not clear how a UE can check if the public key of an
SN has been revoked or not.
4.3 The Proposed Solution
Next we present a protocol that serves the purposes of both privacy protected
identification of UE and mutual authentication between UE and SN. This mutual
authentication does not require a contact with the HN each time the protocol is
run between a UE and an SN. In our solution we do not use PVT but instead use
an expiry time with pre-agreed format. This expiry time can act as the PVT. If
the public key of an identity needs to be revoked, the expiry time along with the
identity is added to the revocation list. If the identity requires a new public key,
the PKG uses another expiry time to compute the private key of the identity. The
newly computed private key is then provisioned to the identity along with the
the new expiry time. When the expiry time comes, all the public keys computed
using the expiry time are automatically revoked. So, the revocation list does not
need to include revocations whose expiry time is in the past.
Fig. 2. Privacy protected UE identification and mutual authentication using IBE
Description of the proposed solution The UE’s HN acts as the PKG. The
solution is pictorially presented in Figure 2. It has two different phases. In the
first phase, the key generations and provisioning take place. In the second phase
the identification and authentication happens. The description follows:
– In step 1.1 the HN generates a public-private key pair ehnid, dhnid.
– In 1.2, the HN provisions the UE with ehnid and due. due is generated using
the private key dhnid, IMSI, and a chosen expiry time ETeu.
– In 1.3, the SN sends the snid to the HN. In 1.4 the HN chooses an expiry
time ET and dsnid is computed considering snid||ET as the SN’s identity.
– In 1.5, the HN sends dsnid, ET, ehnid to the SN. The SN stores these infor-
mation in its key-table.
– In 2.1, the SN broadcasts the snid.
– In 2.2, the UE sends hnid, E(IMSI||ETue||RAND1, esnid), ET to the SN.
– In 2.3, the SN looks for a suitable dsnid and if found, it jumps to step 2.8,
Otherwise continues from step 2.4 and stops at 2.7
– In 2.4, SN sends snid, E(IMSI||ETue||RAND1), ET to HN.
– In 2.5, HN computes the key dsnid using dhnid, snid and ET . Then HN
decrypts the IMSI using dsnid and prepares an AV .
– In 2.6, HN sends AV, IMSI, dsnid to SN. The SN stores dsnid, ET and in 2.7
uses the AV to run the EPS-AKA.
– In 2.8, SN decrypts the received message and compute eue using.
– In 2.9HN sends the signature S(IMSI||RAND1||RAND2, dsnid) along with
E(RAND2, eue) to the UE. The signature is verifiable by esnid in the UE.
– In 2.10, the UE sends the signature S(IMSI||RAND1||RAND2, due) to the
SN which is verifiable by eue. If both UE and SN can verify the signatures
as valid, the mutual authentication is completed successfully.
Note that the UE and the SN have successfully exchanged two randomly
chosen values RAND1 and RAND2 with confidentiality protection. A symmetric
key can be computed at both UE and SN using these random values and ehnid
using a function like key derivation function used in LTE security. There is also
an alternative option of using Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
Revocation of Public Keys The ET used to generate the public key dsnid
is quite near in the future, e.g., the day end. So, if the public key needs to be
revoked, it would automatically be revoked when the expiration time comes.
In this way, a compromised SN would be able mount an attack only for a short
period of time. However, the SN would need to get new dsnid from the HN before
the old dsnid expires.
When the public key of a UE is revoked, the IMSI and relevant ET is stored
in a revocation list in the HN. An SN serving UEs of an HN has a copy of the
list. The SN also periodically checks with the HN if there is any new revoca-
tions. Before computing the public key of the UE in step 2.8, the SN checks the
revocation list. If it is revoked, the SN discards the message received from the
UE and the authentication fails.
All the entries with expiry time older than current date-time can be removed
from the revocation list, hence the revocation list will not grow to a very large
size. This frequent private key exchange and refreshing the revocation list would
create a bit increased traffic between an SN and HN. On the other hand, this
increased traffic is not in the air interface but in the back haul network, which
apparently is not very critical.
5 Comparison of Solutions
In this paper we have discussed two different categories of solutions: pseudonym
based and public-key based. Different solutions [7,8,9,10] have been and more
could be devised based on pseudonyms. All these solutions would require the UE
and the HN to synchronize their pseudonym states between a UE and the HN.
We have categorized the different public-key technologies into three cate-
gories: certificate based, root-key based and identity based. None of them re-
quire to maintain synchronization of states between a UE and the HN. But
these solutions have some downsides. They need comparatively heavier compu-
tational resources, and the ciphertexts are longer which affect the latency. All
these Solutions require a mechanism of key revocation.
In certificate based solutions there is a need of a global PKI. However, in
some variants of certificate based solutions, the effort to manage a PKI can be
reduced significantly. Certificate based solutions require an extra round trip be-
tween the UE and SN to exchange and verify the certificate. In a variant of a
certificate based solution, this extra round trip could be removed at the expense
of provisioning the certificate of an SN to a UE before the UE goes roaming
to the SN. All the certificate based solutions have the requirement of exchang-
ing certificates and verifying them. This creates signalling and computational
overhead which consequently affect the latency.
The root-key based solution does not require any extra round trips or cer-
tificates, hence it has better signalling and computational overhead compared to
certificate based. However, it still suffers from the increased latency in a roaming
situation because every authentication needs to travel all the way to the HN.
This is because no one else except the HN can decrypt the message sent by the
UE. The solution creates also computational pressure in the HN.
We have proposed a novel solution based on IBE that can both accomplish
the identification and mutual authentication. The solution does not need to
maintain synchronized states between a UE and the HN. The solution does not
require a global PKI and does not need certificates. Unlike the root-key based
approach, our solution does not need to involve HN each time authentication is
needed. The aforementioned argument makes the IBE based solution a potential
candidate to solve the problem in question. In Table 1, we present a comparison
among the different solutions based on different criteria.
Apparently pseudonym based solution is very good in most of the criteria.
One downside of pseudonym based approach is, if the pseudonym is unsynchro-
nized between UE and HN, the user has to visit the HN physically and get back
to synchronized state by giving the IMSI in a trusted environment. The need
of visiting the HN physically might make the pseudonym based solution a little
clumsy. Variant 1 of certificate based approach is good in preventing AIC and
also conceals hnid. But this is bad in many other important criteria because
of exchanging and verifying certificates. Considering the concealment of hnid
with a bit less priority, the CertV1 is outperformed by both root-key based and
IBE based solution. CertV2 and CertV3 can not even conceal hnid. So, the ex-
tra overhead of using Certv2 and CertV3 is not worth comparing to root-key
and IBE. When comparing IBE and root-key, both of them are almost similar
except that IBE based solution is extendible to a mutual authentication proto-
col between UE and HN. However, Cert1V can also be extended to a mutual
authentication protocol.
Table 1. Comparative evaluation of the solutions
Criteria Pseudo CertV1 CertV2 CertV3 Root-key IBE
Immunity to AIC + - + + + + +
Concealing hnid - + - - - -
Signalling overhead + + - - - + +
Computational overhead + - - - + +
Latency while roaming - - - - - +
Latency while at home + + - - - + +
PKI effort + + - + + + +
Key revocation ++ - - - + -
Provisioning effort + + + - + +
Using existing gear + - + + + +
Maturity - + + - + -
Mutual Authentication - + + + - +
If concealing hnid is essential, then the only applicable solution is Certv1, the
certificate based solution with global root of trust. If concealment of hnid can
be compromised, then the choice of the solution depends on the requirement of
mutual authentication. If mutual authentication of UE and SN without involving
HN is considered important and useful then IBE based solution is the winner.
Otherwise, root-key based solution is just enough.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed different known approaches to conceal the IMSI.
The solutions are based on pseudonyms and public-key encryption. We have
proposed a novel solution based on identity based encryption that serves the
purposes of both identification and mutual authentication. We have used expiry
time as part of the identity of the entities in the system. We have presented a
qualitative comparison between different solutions. We argue that identity based
encryption is a competitive solution when concealing the home network identity
is not necessary and mutual authentication in between a user equipment and
a serving network is useful without connecting with the home network. The
comparison is based on qualitative analysis based on known facts of public-key
cryptography.
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